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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRIVILEGES FROM LIBEL-NEW
YORK TIMES CO. v. SULLIVAN: DEFINED OR SHACKLED?
Prior to the 1960 New Hampshire Democratic primary election, the
Concord Monitor, a daily newspaper in the state, published a column char-
acterizing Roselle Roy, a senatorial candidate, as being a "former small-time
bootlegger." Roy sued for libel. The state trial judge instructed the jury
that, as a candidate, Roy is a public official and within the New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan' rule of "actual malice." But the judge further stated that
this rule applied only to statements directed at Roy's "public sector," and it
was for the jury to decide whether the article was directed at his "public
sector" or his "private sector" by a probability of the evidence. No evi-
dence was introduced showing known falsehood or recklessness of the
truth on the part of the newspaper. The jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff, and the state supreme court affirmed on the ground that it was
proper for the jury to decide the relevancy of the charge to the plaintiff's
fitness for office. The United States Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded the case to the trial court. It held, as a matter of constitutional
law, that a charge of criminal conduct, no matter how remote in time and
place, can never be irrelevant to an official's or a candidate's fitness for
office for the purpose of applying the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan rule
of "actual malice." Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
On April 18, 1966 the Ocala Star-Banner, a rural Florida newspaper,
published an article stating that Leonard Damron, a local mayor and can-
didate for county office, had recently been indicted in a federal court for
perjury. Damron sued for libel. At the trial, the newspaper entered evi-
dence showing the charge was true as to a relative of the plaintiff, but that
a new editor had inadvertently mixed up their names. Damron entered
contrary evidence as to this allegation of mistake by the newspaper. The
trial court awarded Damron a directed verdict on the issue of liability.. The
trial court held, and the appellate court affirmed, that the perjury charge is
a private libel, and as such is not within the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
rule. The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case
to the trial court. The Court held that a perjury charge against a local
mayor and candidate for county office is relevant to his fitness for office
for the purpose of applying the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan rule of
"actual malice." Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
The immediate significance of these companion decisions lies in that
they represent the broadest interpretation which the United States Supreme
Court has yet given to the concept of "official conduct" within the New
York Times rule. Of underlying and greater significance is that, through
these decisions, the Supreme Court appears to have again refused to extend
the New York Times protections to the ambit of legitimate public interest
alone. The purposes of this case note will be to examine these decisions
in terms of the development of the doctrine of constitutional privileges of
fair comment, and to assess their impact in light of post New York Times
trends.
At common law, slander was first treated as a sin, and one's remedy
was found in the ecclesiastical courts. 2 Libel developed originally as a
crime of inciting a breach of the peace rather than as a tortious injury to
an individual's reputation.8  Both eventually formed the concept of defa-
mation, which reflects the interest society has in protecting the reputation
of its members. 4 This interest, while strong, can be subordinated to other
interests which society deems to be of equal or greater importance than
the injury done to one's standing within it. 5 These other interests, or priv-
ileges, are formulated on the premise that, before the defamer will be al-
lowed to use them, he must show that the reason for the injury he has
done to another is of greater importance than the injury inflicted for which
compensation is sought., Traditionally, these privileges have been grouped
into two basic areas: absolute privilege and conditional or qualified priv-
ilege7-absolute being indefeasible, and conditional being defeasible on its
abuse by the defamer.8  Conditional privilege can be divested from the
defamer who extends his comments either to one not sharing his interest
in them or to areas beyond his interest, or who comments for an improper
purpose.9 The defamer's interest may be his own, a third party's, a com-
mon interest, or a public interest; and, if not abused, it affords a defense
to liability. 10 A public interest may be divided into two categories. One
is the right and duty of each member of the public to communicate a wide
scope of information to proper authorities when necessary. An example
is the duty to report suspected misconduct of a public employee to his su-
2. PROSSER, TORTS 755 (3rd ed. 1964).
3. Id. at 823.
4. Id. at 754.
5. Id. at 805.
6. Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 HARV. L. REV. 413, 427 (1910).
7. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 796 and 805.
8. Id. at 823.
9. Id. at 819.
10. Id. at 821.
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perior. The other area of public interest is the right of each person, indi-
vidually and collectively, to discuss matters which have presented them-
selves before the public and which affect the public. This latter qualified
privilege has come to be known as the right of fair comment." Having by
its nature a broadness in range of publication, it conversely had a limited
scope of subject matter. 12
For fair comment to constitute a valid defense to defamatory liability it
had to be exercised within its prescribed bounds. Since it extended only
to that which was the legitimate concern of the public, any comment outside
the bounds of that concern was not protected. 13 Policies of government,
acts of public officials and candidates, persons or things offered for pub-
lic acceptance, and noteworthy events and those involved in them were
proper subjects of comment and opinion. 14 However, comment had to be
restricted to the public nature of these individuals; and, opinion, while lim-
ited to the same public scope, also had to be drawn from inferences based
on facts truly stated. Hence, an opinion concerning an area of legitimate
public concern was not protected if its factual basis was in error,", while
an opinion drawn on an unreasonable inference from facts truly stated was
within the privilege of fair comment. 16 Thus, it may be seen that the
common law placed more emphasis on preventing untrue facts from enter-
ing public discussion than on preventing poorly founded opinion. In com-
mon law England, misstatements of fact were never privileged' 7 and in-
variably they undermined any defense pertaining to them. On the other
hand, since truth was deemed an absolute defense, there was no loss of
privilege for publishing truthful material which was subsequently miscon-
strued.' 8
American courts paralleled their English counterparts in their application
of libel and slander, and even attempted a brief imitation of the Star Cham-
ber' 9 activities with the passage of the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798.20
11. Id. at 812.
12. id. at 811.
13. Id. at 812.
14. Id. at 813.
15. Wason v. Walter, L.R. 4 Q.B. 73, 96 (1868).
16. Id.
17. See Walker v. Hodgson, [19091 1 K.B. 239; Wisdom v. Brown, I T.L.R. 412
(Q.B. 1885); George v. Goddard, 175 Eng. Rep. 1242 (Q.B. 1861).
18. Supra note 7, at 825. See also RESTATEMENT (FiRsT) OF TORTS, §§ 593-
612 (1934).
19. Originally treated exclusively as a crime, libel was tried in the English Star
Chamber. This institution used it as a convenient means to suppress sedition.
PROSSER, supra note 2.
20. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596. Expired by its own terms in 1801.
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On the question of whether privilege should be extended to misstatements
of fact, the courts were divided; a majority held that they were not pro-
tected, 21 while the minority allowed such protection if they were published
in good faith.22 In 1845 the United States Supreme Court specifically de-
cided, in White v. Nicholls,23 that misstatements of fact are not within the
privilege of fair comment. The plaintiff, a federal official, was accused,
in a series of letters, of having used his position for personal gain. The
Court said a public official or candidate puts his character in issue, and any
honest intent to inform the public of his fitness for office was privileged.
24
However, the court stated:
[T]he publication of falsehood and calumny against public officers, or candidates
for public offices, is an offense dangerous to the people, and deserves punishment,
because the people may be deceived, and reject their best citizens, to their great in-
jury, and, it may be to the loss of their liberties. 25
Justice Holmes gave the majority view its definitive state court arguments
21. See Alabama: Starks v. Comer, 190 Ala. 245, 67 So. 440 (1914); Ari-
zona: Arizona Publishing Co. v. Harris, 20 Ariz. 446, 181 P. 373 (1919); Dela-
ware: Star Publishing Co. v. Danahoe, 58 A. 513 (Del. 1904); Illinois: Proesel
v. Myers Publishing Co., 24 Ill. App. 2d 501, 165 N.E.2d 352 (1960); Kentucky:
Tipton v. Rains, 228 Ky. 677, 15 S.W.2d 496 (1929); Maine: Pattangall v.
Mooers, 113 Me. 412, 94 A. 561 (1915); Maryland: Negley v. Farrow, 60 Md. 158,
45 Am. Dec. 715 (1882); Massachusetts: Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154
Mass. 238, 28 N.E. 1 (1891); Michigan: Moore v. Booth Publishing Co., 216
Mich. 653, 185 N.W. 780 (1921); Missouri: Conrad v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
228 Mo. App. 817, 73 S.W.2d 438 (1934); New Jersey: Lindsey v. Evening Journal
Ass'n, 10 N.J. Misc. 1275, 163 A. 245 (1932); New York: Hamilton v. Eno, 81
N.Y. 116 (1880); Ohio: Post Publishing Co. v. Moloney, 50 Ohio St. 71, 33 N.E.
921 (1893); Oklahoma: Lindley v. Delman, 166 Okla. 165, 26 P.2d 751 (1933);
Oregon: Peck v. Coos Bay Times Publishing Co., 122 Ore. 408, 259 P. 307
(1927); South Carolina: Jackson v. Record Publishing Co., 178 S.E. 833 (1935);
Texas: Fort Worth Press Co. v. Davis, 96 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936);
Virginia: Williams Printing Co. v. Saunders, 113 Va. 156, 73 S.E. 472 (1912);
Washington: Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d 847 (1933);
Wisconsin: Finnegan v. Eagle Printing Co., 173 Wis. 5, 179 N.W. 788 (1920).
22. See California: Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1
(1921); Iowa: Salinger v. Cowles, 195 Iowa 873, 191 N.W. 167 (1922); Kansas:
Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908); Minnesota: Friedell v.
Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 203 N.W. 974 (1925); New Hampshire:
Lafferty v. Houlihan, 81 N.H. 67, 121 A. 92 (1923); North Carolina: Lewis v.
Carr, 178 N.C. 578, 101 S.E. 97 (1919); Pennsylvania: Mulderig v. Wilkes-Barre
Times, 215 Pa. 470, 64 A. 636 (1906); South Dakota: McLean v. Merriman, 42
S.D. 394, 175 N.W. 878 (1920); Utah: Williams v. Standard-Examiner Publishing
Co., 83 Utah 31, 27 P.2d 1 (1933); Vermont: Posnett v. Marble, 62 Vt. 481,
20 A. 813 (1890); West Virginia: Swearingen v. Parkersburg Sentenel Co., 125
W. Va. 731, 26 S.E.2d 209 (1943).
23. 44 U.S. 266 (1845).
24. Id. at 289.
25. Id. at 289.
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in Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co.26 in 1891. A series of four newspa-
per articles had accused an official with the New York Customs House of
engaging in fraud and bribery to reduce the tariff on imported sugar.
Holmes held that so far as the articles contained false statements of fact,
they were not privileged. 27 Expounding on the issue, he added:
[W]hat is privileged, if that is the proper term, is criticism, not statement, and
however it might be if a person merely quoted or referred to a statement as made
by others, and gave it no new sanction, if he takes upon himself in his
own person to allege facts otherwise libellous, he will not be privileged if those facts
are not true, . .. 28
and
it is not a justification that the defendant had reasonable cause to believe its charges
to be true. A person publishes libellous matter at his peril.29
The definitive federal argument for the majority view was set out in
Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam30 in 1893. An article had accused a candi-
date for Congress of selling out his delegate support at a state convention
in return for his opponent paying his campaign expenses. The court
rejected the minority doctrine as doing the public more harm than good.
Here the court stated what became the major criticism of the minority
view:
[T]he danger that honorable and worthy men may be driven from. . . public service
by allowing too great latitude in attacks upon their characters outweighs any benefit
that might occasionally accrue to the public from charges of corruption that are
true in fact, but are incapable of legal proof.3 1
An Ohio court echoed this argument in Post Publishing Co. v. Maloney,3 2
involving articles accusing a city policeman of having a criminal record.
In a 1936 case, Washington Times Co. v. Bonner,'3 involving charges of
26. 154 Mass. 238, 28 N.E. 1 (1891).
27. Id. at 244, 28 N.E. at 5.
28. Id. at 242, 28 N.E. at 4.
29. Id. at 245, 28 N.E. at 5.
30. 59 F. 530 (6th Cir. 1893).
31. Id. at 541.
32. 50 Ohio St. 71, 89, 33 N.E. 921, 926 (1893): "To hold otherwise, would,
in our judgment, drive reputable men from public positions, and fill their places
with others having no regard for their reputation; and thus defeat the object of the
rule contended for, and overturn the reason upon which it is sought to sustain it."
33. 86 F.2d 836 (1936), where the court stated: "[Tihe great weight of
authority in the state courts, and the rule in the Federal courts, is to the contrary-
that the right of fair comment does not extend to misstatements of fact." Id. at
842. But see Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1942), wherein the
circuit court in dismissing plaintiff's libel complaint for alleging only libel per
quod, and failing to indicate special damages stated misstatements of fact are not
actionable: "so long as no charge of crime, corruption, gross immorality or gross
incompetency is made and no special damage results." Id. at 458.
252 [Vol. XXI
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influence peddling by an officer of the Federal Power Commission, the cir-
cuit court of appeals, after liberally quoting from the Burt and Hallam
cases, emphasized that the predominant view on the question of privilege
for false statements of fact had not changed.
The minority view of state court decisions following the "liberal doc-
trine" is best exemplified by Coleman v. MacLennan.34  A charge by a
newspaper that the incumbent attorney general had been involved in mis-
appropriation of school funds resulted in a libel suit. It was ruled that
where misstatements of fact are published in good faith, with an honest
belief in their truth and the necessity for the protection of the public, they
are privileged, even though injury is caused.3 5  The court's rationale is
that the importance and advantage of public discussion is so "vast" that
it "more than counterbalanced" the injury to the individual which may be
great.36 The court reviewed and rejected the arguments for the more
narrow doctrine found in the Hallam case and reiterated in others. It
stated that in Kansas no one has been driven from public office by the
"liberal" rule, and qualified men continue to apply for office.3 7 The court
added:
Manifestly a candidate must surrender to public scrutiny and discussion so much of
his private character as affects his fitness for office, and the liberal rule requires no
more. But in measuring the extent of a candidate's profert of character it should
always be remembered that the people have good authority for believing that grapes
do not grow on thorns nor figs on thistles.38
The court further stated:
It must apply to all officers and agents of government-municipal, state and national;
to the management of all public institutions-educational, charitable and penal; to
the conduct of all corporate enterprises affected with a public interest-transporta-
tion, banking, insurance, and to innumerable other subjects involving the public wel-
fare.39
This statement foreshadowed things to come.
California adopted the "liberal" doctrine as a result of Snively v. Record
Publishing Co.,40 a case which overruled the state's prior cases applying
the majority rule. The facts involved the publication of an editorial car-
34. 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908).
35. Id. at 722, 98 P. at 285. See Kansas v. Balch, 31 Kan. 465, 2 P. 609
(1884), where it was held that charging an official with vote fraud was privileged
if published in good faith with an honest belief in its truth.
36. Coleman v. MacLennan, supra note 34, at 724, 98 P. at 286.
37. Supra note 34, at 733, 98 P. at 288.
38. Supra note 34, at 739, 98 P. at 291.
39. Supra note 34, at 734, 98 P. at 289.
40. 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921).
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toon representing the Los Angeles police chief as a graft-taking public
thief. The court held that the rights of newspapers are no different from
the rights of any other citizen, 41 adding:
When under these conditions he honestly believes that the person of whom he speaks
or writes is guilty of a crime of a nature that makes the fact material to the
interests of those whom he addresses, it is as much his right and duty to declare
to them that fact as it would be to tell them any other fact pertinent to the
occasion and material to their interests.4 2
All of the minority states removed the privilege of the "liberal" doctrine
upon a showing that the publication was the result of express malice. This
was not the implied or fictional malice that the common law attributed to
an unprivileged defamatory publication, but was the evil mind, spite, or
ill will that motivated the publication, 43 as shown by convincing evidence.
Hence, on the issue of liability for false statements of fact, American courts
held either that there was no defense, or there was a qualified defense,
given good faith and honest belief.
Prior to 1964, defamation was held to be outside the sphere of protec-
tion afforded by the first amendment. While broad in their protection,
guarantees of free speech and press are not absolutes. 44  In 1941, the
United States Supreme Court, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,4 5 a case
turning on the constitutionality of a state law prohibiting the offensive ad-
dressing of another in public, enumerated types of speech outside constitu-
tional protection:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional prob-
lem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insult-
ing or "fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace. 4 6
The value of a strong and uninhibited press was not lost on the Supreme"
Court. In Stromberg v. California47 the Court stated that free political
41. Id. at 571, 198 P. at 3.
42. Id. at 576, 198 P. at 5.
43. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 821.
44. FoRKoscH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 436 (2d ed. 1963). See generally Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931);
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
45. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
46. Id. at 571-72. Accord Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). The
Court, in upholding a state law prohibiting race or ethnic libel, stated: "Libelous
utterances [are] not . . . within the area of constitutionally protected speech . .. .
Id. at 266.
47. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
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speech, in order to make government responsive to the will of the people,
is fundamental to our system of government. 48  Again in Grosjean v.
American Press Co.,4 9 where a state law attempted to tax newspapers over
a certain circulation size, the Court stated that to "fetter" the press is to
"fetter" ourselves: 50
[I]nformed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment,
the suppression or abridgment of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be
regarded otherwise than with grave concern. 51
Thus the Supreme Court, while stating that an unbridled press constituted
one of the most important elements in the efficient workings of our society,
held that libel and slander were outside the guaranteed free speech protec-
tions. Coupled with the fact that the Court adhered to the majority's nar-
row view that misstatements of fact are privileged,5 2 it can be surmised that
the Court felt the latter was in no way inhibitive of the free exercise of con-
stitutional guarantees. A change of perspective would come with the ad-
vent of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.53
The New York Times published a paid advertisement which accused
the police of an Alabama city of harassment tactics and arrests in reprisal
for a civil rights demonstration held there. Some of these charges were
untrue, as a review of the newspaper's own files had shown. One of the
commissioners of the city sued the New York Times, alleging that there
was enough of a colloquium in the advertisement to defame him. The
Supreme Court of the United States reversed the plaintiff's verdict holding:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"-that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not.
5 4
The Court concluded that the prior majority rule as to privilege and false
statements was an infringement on first amendment rights,55 and, to the
extent that a public official is criticized in his official conduct, adopted the
minority "liberal" doctrine as a matter of constitutional law, explaining that
"a rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all
48. Id. at 369.
49. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
50. Id. at 250.
51. Id.
52. Supra note 25.
53. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
54. Id. at 279-80.
55. Id. at 279.
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his factual assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments... -leads
to a comparable 'self-censorship.' "6
Writers have commented that the Times case has established a middle
ground between the absolute right of seditious libel and the protection of
individual reputation. 5 7 They also have pointed to the fact that the Times
case did not define its terms "official conduct," "public official," and
"reckless disregard." Federal and state court case law soon began narrow-
ing the concept of "public official" to include a presidential candidate,58
a public assessor, 59 a chairman of a county political organization, ° a
state's attorney general, 61 a city attorney,6 2 a city policeman,6 3 an elected
member of a local school board, 4 and a principal of a school.6 5 In Garri-
son v. Louisiana,6 a parish prosecutor was convicted under state criminal
libel law for his remarks that eight judges were lazy, inefficient, indifferent
to vice, and subject to "racketeering" influence. Holding the Times case
applicable to criminal libel6 7 the United States Supreme Court further de-
fined "official conduct":
[A]nything which might touch on an official's fitness for office is relevant ...
[flew more [things are] germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance,
or improper motivation, even though these ...may also effect [his] private char-
acter. 68
"Reckless disregard" was further defined as "the high degree of awareness
of their probable falsity. ."69 Whether the Times case standards ap-
56. Id.
57. Bertelsman, The First Amendment and Protection of Reputation and Pri-
vacy-New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and How It Grew, 56 Ky. L.J. 718, 741
(1968).
58. Goldwater v. Ginsberg, 261 F. Supp. 784 (S.D. N.Y. 1966).
59. Eadie v. Pole, 91 N.J. Super. 504, 221 A.2d 547 (1966).
60. McNabb v. Tennessean Newspapers, Inc., 55 Tenn. App. 380, 400 S.W.2d
871 (1965).
61. Phoenix Newspaper, Inc. v. Church, 103 Ariz. 582, 447 P.2d 840 (1968).
62. Tunnell v. Edwardsville Intelligencer, Inc., 99 Ill. App.2d 1, 241 N.E.2d 28
(1968).
63. Caursey v. Greater Niles Twp. Publishing Corp., 40 Ill.2d 257, 239 N.E.2d
837 (1968).
64. Cabin v. Community Newspapers, Inc., 27 App. Div.2d 543, 275 N.Y.S.2d
396 (1966).
65. Reaves v. Foster, 200 So. 2d 453 (Miss. 1967).
66. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
67. Id. at 67.
68. Id. at 77.
69. Id. at 74. See Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1964), where the Court
reversed the plaintiff's verdict in a libel action on the basis that the jury was
instructed on intent to do harm rather than intent to do harm through falsehood;
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plied to a former county resort manager was the issue in Rosenblatt v.
Baer.70 The Supreme Court again refined its Times case terms, holding:
[T]he "public official" designation applies at the very least to those among the
hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, sub-
stantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of government affairs. 7'
The case was remanded to the trial court for a hearing in accordance with
this refinement. With Garrison and Rosenblatt, the Court began a gradual
expansion of the application of the Times rule, and a further delineation of
its terms.
In 1966 and 1967 the Supreme Court decided two cases which have
proved difficult to reconcile with past and recent cases of a similar nature.
Linn v. Plant Guard Workers72 concerned statements made about the
plaintiff, a union member, in the midst of a union dispute. Though the
plaintiff was nothing more than a private individual involved in a note-
worthy labor dispute, the Court ruled he was subject to the Times standards
of "actual malice. ' '7 3 Time, Inc. v. Hill7 4 was an invasion of privacy suit.
The plaintiff and his family had been involved in a famous incident con-
cerning escaped convicts. The true facts were fictionalized into a stage
play, which the defendant's article represented to be the true facts. Again
the Court held this individual subject to the Times case standard:
The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression
or comment upon public affairs. . . . [e]xposure of self to others in varying degrees
is a concomitant of life. . . . The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of
life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and press. 75
These two cases appear to replace the Times case ambit and turn only
on the question of public issue. 76 However, neither have been followed by
the Court in subsequent decisions.
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts77 was also decided in 1967. Two sep-
arate cases were consolidated by the Court and decided together. The
Butts case arose out of an accusation that the plaintiff, a university football
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), where the Court, in reversing a
libel judgment for a police chief, defined reckless disregard as the entertainment of
"serious doubts" as to the truth of a statement.
70. 383 U.S. 75 (1965).
71. Id. at 85.
72. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
73. Id. at 62-3.
74. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
75. Id. at 388.
76. Merin, Libel and the Supreme Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REv. 371, 402
(1969).
77. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
1971]
258 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXI
coach, had conspired with a rival coach to "fix" a game. The Walker case
involved a press dispatch stating that the plaintiff, a prominent former army
officer, had incited and led rioters against federal marshals at the integra-
tion of a Southern university. Four justices reached a plurality decision
holding both Butts and Walker to be "public figures," as opposed to "public
officials," and as such could recover upon a showing of "highly unreason-
able conduct constituting an extreme departure from standards of investi-
gation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers."' ,,
This was something less than the "actual malice" test and amounts to re-
covery based on gross negligence. Three justices ruled that the "actual
malice" test should apply to "public figures" as well as "public officials."
And two justices ruled that, where questions of public concern are in-
volved, the privilege from liability should be absolute.79 Hence five of
nine justices stated the test for "public figures" should be "actual malice"
or greater. Consequently, the plurality decision cannot be considered as
controlling.80 As in the Times case, the Court here again left undecided
who is a "public figure." Upon the premise that a public figure is one
who has "thrust" himself into the "vortex of the discussion of a pressing
public concern," 8 1 lower federal and state courts have held an outspoken
scientist,82 a vociferous critic of urban renewal,8 8 an author,8 4 and the
chairman of a conservative political party 5 to be "public figures."
The 1968 decision of Pickering v. Bd. of Education,"" like the Linn and
the Hill cases, appears to be a departure from precedent. Plaintiff, a
teacher, through a letter to a newspaper, criticized the local school board
for mismanagement of tax revenue. The charges were in error and he
78. Id. at 155.
79. Id. at 172.
80. Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and
Walker, 1967 S. CT. REv. 267, 307.
81. Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188, 195 (8th Cir.
1966). See Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659 (2nd Cir. 1964).
82. Pauling v. Globe-Democrat, supra note 81, at 188.
83. Beatty v. Ellings, 285 Minn. 293, 173 N.W.2d 12 (1969).
84. Dacey v. Florida Bar, Inc., 427 F.2d 1292 (4th Cir. 1970).
85. Tait v. King Broadcasting Co., 460 P.2d 307 (Wash. App. 1969). Others
finding plaintiff a "public figure" have refused to apply the Times rule because of
the plaintiff's limited access to media for rebuttal. See Dempsey v. Times, Inc.,
43 Misc. 2d 754, 252 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1964) (a prizefighter); Faulk v. Aware, Inc.,
14 N.Y.2d 954, 202 N.E.2d 372 (1964), cert. denied 380 U.S. 916 (1964) (a radio
performer); Lorellard v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 65 Ill. App. 2d 65, 213 N.E.2d 1
(1965) (a socialite); Fignole v. Curtis Publishing Co., 247 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.
N.Y. 1965) (a citizen prominent in foreign country only).
86. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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was shortly thereafter fired. In his suit to regain his position the Court
held:
In sum, we hold that, in a case such as this, absent proof of false statements know-
ingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher's exercise of his right to speak on issues
of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public em-
ployment. 87
Once again the Court appears to have lowered its level of constitutional
protection to the public issue strata. If, however, the Court wished to
definitively state such, an ample opportunity was presented in Greenbelt
Pub. Ass'n. v. Bresler. s  Plaintiff, a state legislator and prominent real
estate developer, owned property which a local city wished to use for
school facilities. The defendant's article reported events at a city council
meeting in which officials negotiated with Bresler on the terms for the sale
of the parcel. One official was quoted in the article as stating Bresler was
"blackmailing" the city. He sued, stating that the article had accused him
of a crime. By way of reference the Court said: "There can be no ques-
tion that the public debates at the sessions . . . regarding Bresler's nego-
tiations with the city were a subject of substantial concern to all who lived
in the community. '89 But the Court then proceeded to rule that, as a
prominent developer, Bresler was a "public figure." 90 The case eventually
turned on the ruling that the word "blackmail," in the context in which it
was reported, could not constitutionally be deemed libel.91
While the Supreme Court showed reluctance to extend the first amend-
ment protections to questions of public concern, regardless of the standing
of the parties, the lower federal courts, and two state courts, were not. A
New York court in All Diet Food Distributors, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,92 held
that the defendant's article, which mentioned plaintiff's store, was an ex-
pos6 of "food fads and frauds," and therefore was privileged. The court
stated that the subject matter was one of considerable public concern, and
the motivation for publication was the disclosure of an important matter
of public interest.93
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held, in United
Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,94 that
87. Id. at 574.
88. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
89. Id. at 13.
90. Id. at 9.
91. Id. at 13.
92. 56 Misc. 2d 821, 290 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1967).
93. Id. at 824, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 448.
94. 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968).
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an expos6 of the health menace caused by the plaintiff's inaccuracies in
public testing was privileged:
[T]he area of public interest to whch they relate . . . would seem to us to be one
of such inherent public concern and stake that there could be no possible question
as to the applicability of the New York Times standard. . .. 95
Justifying its extension of the "actual malice" rule to questions of public
issue, the court stated that the Times case was a guideline for further de-
velopment and not an outer limit on constitutional protections. 96 Bon Air
Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc.97 reiterated this view. In this case the defend-
ant's article characterizing a hotel as providing poor service while charging
exorbitant prices was deemed within the Times rule. Here the court of
appeals specifically affirmed the district court's ruling that the "actual mal-
ice" test applies regardless of whether a "public figure" or "official" is
involved.9 8 Again, in Wasserman v. Time, Inc.99 a charge that an attorney
who succeeded in obtaining his client's release from arrest had in fact been
arrested with him was ruled to be privileged. Even though the attorney
was not a public official, the court of appeals held that he was involved
in a matter of public concern and therefore subject to the Times rule.100
Other federal courts have followed this interpretation. 10 1
Significantly, the Monitor and Ocala decisions have given the concept
of "official conduct" its broadest application to date. By holding that a
charge of criminal conduct is always "relevant" to an official's or candi-
date's fitness for office, the Court has given color to the outline of "official
conduct" it drew in the Garrison'0 2 case. However, in its dictum, the Court
has for practical purposes made the term all inclusive:
Indeed, whatever vitality the "official conduct" concept may retain with regard to
occupants of public office . . . it is clearly of little applicability in the context of
an election campaign . . . . [i]t is by no means easy to see what statements about a
candidate might be altogether without relevance to his fitness for the office he
seeks.108
95. Id. at 711.
96. Id. at 710.
97. 295 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. Geo. 1969), aff'd, 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970).
98. Id. at 708.
99. 424 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
100. Id. at 922.
101. Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1969); Arizona Bio-
chemical Co. v. Hearst Corp., 302 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. N.Y. 1969); Cerrito v. Time,
Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1071 (N.D. Cal. 1969); DeSalvo v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 300 F. Supp. 742 (D. Mass. 1969); Altoona Clay Products, Inc. v.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 899 (W.D. Penn. 1968); Farnsworth v.
Tribune Co., 43 Il1. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969).
102. Supra at note 66.
103. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 274-75 (1971).
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The Court continued, stating that whether there remains some area of
defamation to which a candidate might have "full recourse" was not in is-
sue. 10 4 The principal activity of a candidate consists in pressing before the
electorate every conceivable aspect of his public and private life which he
feels may exemplify his qualifications. Hence, a candidate who offers his
spotless record and "sterling integrity" cannot object when others attempt
to demonstrate the contrary. 10 5 It should be realized that the Court spe-
cifically included "public officials" within its "relevancy" standard in both
the Monitor and Ocala cases.' 0 By these decisions the Court has ex-
panded the "official conduct" term to a greater extent than in any previous
case it has decided.
As has previously been stated, many courts have replaced the person-
orientated Times rule with one predicated on mere public concern.
10 7 It
would seem that this is consistent with the Court's announced policy of
"a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. ... 108 The anom-
alies of the Linn, Hill, and Pickering cases in contrast to the other decisions
of the Court can be attributed only to the concept of public issue on which
they turned: "[A]lthough the First Amendment principles pronounced in
New York Times guide our conclusion, we reach that conclusion only by
applying these principles in this discrete context."' 0 9 Yet, the Court has
not felt bound by these decisions. This fact has resulted in comment and
criticism from various writers:
The upshot . . . is that the logic of the New York Times and Hill taken together
grants the press some measure of constitutional protection for anything the press
thinks is a matter of public interest.110
Another writer, attributing the Court's reluctance to the lack of a proper
case on which to make the full transition, predicted it would be forthcom-
ing."' However, with the arrival and passing of the Greenbelt case, it ap-
pears that the Court has refused to forsake the person-orientated ambit
for one centering upon legitimate public interest. As a by-product, the
Monitor and Ocala decisions seem to be a re-emphasis of this refusal, if by
104. Id. at 275.
105. Id. at 274.
106. Id. at 277; Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 300 (1971).
107. See text accompanying supra notes 92-101.
108. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 53, at 270.
109. Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra note 74, at 390-91.
110. Kalven, supra note 80, at 284.
111. Comment, Calculated Misstatements of Fact Not Protected by First Amend-
ment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press, 1969 UTAH L. REV. 118, 139.
1971]
262 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXI
omission only. In neither opinion did the Court leave the person-orien-
tated ambit and even discuss the question of public concern as an issue.
It can be argued that the Court is under no obligation to resolve cases by
formulating new rules when they can be disposed of under prior decision.
Conversely, it may also be said that, in light of developing case law apply-
ing the "public interest" test, it is significant that in Greenbelt, and now in
Monitor and Ocala, the Court chose to ignore it as an issue. Future case
law from the Court will be necessary to determine whether the "public in-
terest" test will or will not be the standard of privilege granted.
Richard Lee
